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We seek to analyze a number of important issues related to the ownership of government 
pensions.  In the United States, Social Security is operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, with 
some limited pre-funding to prepare for the baby boom retirement.  Moving toward more 
of a defined contribution system will require accounting for many details.  Social 
Security will still need to find ways to cover its unfunded liabilities to past and present 
retirees, as well as to workers who have paid into the system.  There are also many issues 
which will need to be clarified regarding the ownership of personal accounts: will 
participation be voluntary or mandatory, will annuitization be required, and how freely 
can participants choose their investment strategy.  An assessment of personal accounts 
must also fully incorporate the role of disability benefits and survivor benefits.  Finally, 
what will happen in the new system if the accounts do not achieve their expected returns?  
We use the example of the United States to highlight many important issues faced by 
countries looking to use defined-contribution pensions as a response to aging populations. 
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  Aging populations have pushed retirement pension reform issues into prominence 
in a number of countries throughout the world.  One avenue of reform is to replace 
traditional defined-benefit systems with defined-contribution systems.  This paper 
explores the debate over such reform in the United States in order to highlight a number 
of important issues concerning the efficacy of such reforms.  Like many countries, the 
United States faces a situation in which the existing retirement pension programs will not 
be able to provide the full amounts of presently legislated benefits to future populations.  
This is because the aging population of baby boomers, coupled with longer life 
expectancies and declining fertility rates, will lead to an increasing dependency ratio.  
There will be more and more retirees for each working age person.  President George W. 
Bush’s plan for reform in the United States includes a large role for Personal Retirement 
Accounts (PRAs), a type of defined-contribution account.  With PRAs, workers would 
obtain control over some portion of their payroll tax, investing this money for their own 
use during retirement, which moves the country closer to the President’s goal of creating 
an “ownership society.”  This paper analyzes such an approach to reforming Social 
Security in the context of the United States, illustrating a number of issues that must be 
examined more carefully before making PRAs a viable reform for any country. 
  PRA advocates argue that such accounts allow workers to control their economic 
destiny because they “own” their retirement benefits.  This is contrasted with the current 
Social Security system in which benefits can be reduced on the whims of Congress.  We 
wish to explore this concept of ownership more deeply in the context of the many roles 
that Social Security plays in modern life.  On the surface, people do not have a property 
right to Social Security benefits, while they would indeed own their PRAs.  But this 3 
paper argues that it is somewhat disingenuous to claim that PRAs will create a type of 
ownership that does not exist in the present system.  The case is stated around four 
central points.   
  First, the problem with the existing system is that there are already large unfunded 
liabilities, because people in the past were paid much more benefits than what they 
contributed to the system through taxes.  Social Security also has large unfunded 
liabilities for current workers and retirees who paid taxes into the system and are eligible 
for benefits.  Any privatization of Social Security will still need to deal with how these 
promised benefits would be paid.  As such, if one accounts for the unfunded liability that 
must be paid in the future if people are to receive the benefits they have been promised, 
then the creation of PRAs does not change much.  People in the future will still need to 
pay higher taxes or receive lower benefits from the traditional Social Security system to 
maintain a balance in the system’s finances.   
  A second problem with viewing PRAs as a true shift to ownership is that, by most 
accounts, there will still be many restrictions on PRAs.  If so, people will not be 
completely free to make all of their own choices.  If participation is mandatory, if people 
are forced to annuitize their assets at a particular age, and if people are limited to only a 
few possible investment options, then it is not clear how much ownership one could 
derive from a PRA as opposed to the traditional Social Security benefit.  But increasing 
freedom regarding the treatment of PRAs will create adverse selection problems that 
could undermine the system, as well as lead many people to gamble away their future 
retirement pensions on risky or unwise equity bets. 4 
  The third issue regards the legal treatment of disability and survivor benefits when 
using PRAs.  More work must be done to decide how PRAs will deal with the problems 
of disability and survivors.  Social Security provides value as a social insurance system 
that responds to retirement, disability, and death.  But too many advocates of personal 
accounts overlook the role of disability and survivor benefits.   
  Finally, the issue remains as for what can be done if PRAs do not produce as large 
of returns as their advocates expect.  Advocates of personal accounts often cite the 
historically high returns associated with the stock market, relative to the perceived returns 
from a worker’s Social Security taxes, as a sure-fire way of improving the fiscal picture 
for Social Security while simultaneously increasing benefit payments to retirees.  
However, the riskiness of the stock market means that even though returns could be 
higher on average, there is no promise of higher benefits for any given individual.  PRAs 
will be subject to more volatility and risk.  Unfortunately, the most comprehensive of 
existing analyses of Social Security reform with personal retirement accounts use the 
deterministic forecasts of the Social Security Administration, which show how the mean 
return could change but not show the associated variability of results.  We include the 
results of a simulation to demonstrate some of these risks.  How the system will respond 
if the stock market underperforms must be planned for in advance.   
  Ostensibly, PRAs provide a way to expand President Bush’s “ownership society,” 
but underlying issues will limit such accounts: the unfunded liabilities of Social Security 
must still be paid, restraints on individual behavior will likely be necessary, and the 
response to disability or death as well as the volatility of equity and bonds must be 
addressed.   5 
2   Background of the United States Social Security System 
2.1 Brief History of Social Security in the United States 
Social Security is a program that encompasses approximately 98% of jobs and 
that currently provides benefits to one in six Americans.  Recipients of Social Security 
benefits include not just retirees, but also disabled workers, spouses and young children 
of deceased or disabled workers, and the spouses of retirees.  However, this was not 
always the case.  In fact, the original Social Security Act of 1935 created retirement 
benefits for only the retired worker, who became eligible at age 65.  In 1939, Congress 
passed amendments to extend benefits to spouses and minor children of retired workers, 
as well as to the widows and minor children of deceased workers.  Disability insurance 
arrived in 1954, and in subsequent years, the disability program expanded to include the 
families of disabled workers.  In 1972, Congress passed legislation to create annual cost-
of-living adjustments for benefit levels.  Prior to that time, benefit increases were subject 
to the whims of Congress and happened only intermittently.   
The 1975 Social Security Trustee’s report estimated that the Old-Age, Survivors, 
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Funds would be depleted by 1979.  The program 
generally desires to have its Trust Fund not projected to run out (given all of the expected 
future tax collections less benefit payments) for at least 75 years, so leaders viewed this 
as a serious problem.  In 1977, Congress enacted amendments to deal with the impending 
financial problems.  The amendments increased the payroll tax, increased the amount of 
income that was eligible for the payroll tax, and reduced benefits slightly.   
But because of the economic slowdown in the early 1980s, the Trust Fund again 
faced serious short-term funding problems.  Alan Greenspan headed a commission to 6 
examine this problem in 1983.  The Greenspan Commission called for, and Congress 
subsequently passed into law, an increase in the normal retirement age to gradually 
extend from 65 to 67, increases in Social Security tax rates, and the addition of new taxes 
for the benefits of the wealthiest individuals.  The goal was not only to solve the 
immediate financial problems, but also to build up a surplus over the next few decades in 
anticipation of the inevitable Trust Fund drain resulting from the coming baby boomer 
retirement.  Under the current law, the combined employee/employer tax rate for OASDI 
is 12.4%, and the normal retirement age is beginning its slow ascent toward 67 for those 
born in 1960 and later. 
2.2 The Outlook of Social Security in the United States  
That Social Security is expected to again undergo funding shortages at some point 
in the future should come as no surprise.  Social Security in the United States is meant to 
be pay-as-you-go, meaning that each generation of current workers pays for the benefits 
of the current retirees.  Three trends, though, will make this an increasingly difficult task 
despite the present surpluses.  First, the baby boom cohort is of unprecedented size and 
will begin retiring in less than ten years.  Second, life spans are becoming longer, 
meaning that the retiring baby boomers will enjoy longer retirements.  The 2005 
Trustee’s Report indicates that when Social Security benefit payments began in 1940, the 
cohort life expectancy for men and women who reached the age of 65 were 12.7 and 14.7 
years, respectively.  Men and women retiring in 2000 share a normal retirement age of 
65, but their projected cohort life expectancies have increased to 16.5 and 19.3 years, 
respectively.  The SSA expects such trends to continue in the future, as men and women 
born in 2000 and who live to reach 65 in 2065 can be expected to live for another 20.4 7 
and 23.0 years, respectively.  The third important trend is the decrease in fertility rates.  
During the height of the baby boom, women, on average, were having between 3.5 and 4 
children each during their lifetimes.  Now these numbers are closer to 2, and the 2005 
Trustee’s Report expects the long-run fertility rate in the United States to be just 1.95.   
Combining these three trends means that there will be fewer workers available to 
support the retirees in 10 to 30 years.  The SSA predicts that the ratio of people aged 65 
and older to those aged between 20 and 64 will increase from 0.208 in 2000 to 0.350 in 
2030.  In other words, the ratio of the working age population to the retirees is expected 
to fall from about 5:1 to 3:1.  As indicated, a legacy of the 1983 Greenspan Commission 
is that the Trust Fund accumulates more each year than it spends in order to build a 
buffer.  However, in the 2005 Trustee’s Report, the best guess for the future is that while 
the OASDI Trust Fund will continue to run surpluses until 2017, it is projected to run out 
of money by 2041 so that subsequent years will be met with drastic cuts in benefits, 
increases in taxes, or borrowing from the rest of the government’s budget.  In 2041, the 
tax revenue that arrives would be enough to pay 74% of legislated benefits once the Trust 
Fund is depleted.  The Trustees find that an immediate increase in the payroll tax of 1.92 
percentage points, or an immediate across the board reduction in Social Security benefits 
of 13%, or some combination of the two, would restore actuarial balance to Social 
Security over the 75 year horizon.  Nevertheless, the changes would need to be even 
more severe to provide stability over an even longer time horizon. 
2.3 Legal Treatment of Social Security Benefits 
  As indicated before, there have been instances in American history when 
Congress legislated a reduction in Social Security benefits.  One might question whether 8 
this is legal by arguing that the payment of Social Security taxes creates a legal right to 
obtain the legislated benefits.  If such an arrangement constitutes a contract, then 
Congress has no legal authority to reduce benefits.  The U.S. Supreme Court examined 
this situation in the 1960 case of Flemming v. Nestor.    Nestor had been receiving Social 
Security benefits at the time he was deported from the United States for his previous 
membership in the Communist Party.  His Social Security benefits receipt ended with his 
deportation, and he sued with the argument that he had a “property right” to continue 
receiving benefits.  The Court concluded that no contract exists to guarantee a particular 
level of benefits, and Congress has the authority to modify benefit payments in 
reasonable ways in order to adjust to changing conditions (Swendiman and Nicola, 2005). 
  This conclusion is used by advocates of personal retirement accounts to justify 
eliminating the traditional system.  For example, the Cato Institute wrote about this issue 
in 1999 by stating: 
With fully private personal retirement accounts, workers would have a 
property right in their retirement savings.  They would own their accounts 
and the money in them, the same way people own the money in their 
savings accounts.  That property right would protect workers’ savings 
from politicians looking to pinch pennies in a debt-riddled system.  
Workers deserve the security of owning their retirement savings. 
In this view, the importance of PRAs would be to give people control of their own 
economic destiny by ensuring they have a legal right to obtain retirement benefits.  This 
is the context in which personal retirement accounts have been proposed.   
2.4 President Bush’s Path for Reform: Personal Retirement Accounts 
The President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) report offers 
three different sets of reforms, all of which include some form of voluntary personal 
accounts.  The first reform proposal (Plan 1) is not intended to restore actuarial balance.  9 
It creates voluntary personal retirement accounts for up to 2% of a worker’s taxable 
payroll.  The remainder of the payroll tax (10.4% under the presently legislated payroll 
tax of 12.4%) enters into the traditional Social Security system.  Upon retirement, a 
beneficiary may annuitize the personal retirement account.   
Traditional Social Security benefits will be offset by an amount that depends on 
the levels contributed to the PRA.  Any funds entered into the PRA will also be entered 
into a hypothetical calculation in which the funds grow at an “offset yield rate” that, in 
the case of Plan 1, averages 3.5% plus the rate of inflation.  Policymakers would decide 
whether to use the fixed 3.5% rate, or to calculate the number as 0.5% above the realized 
or expected annual market yield on long-term Treasury bonds (forecasted to be 3.0%).  
Between these choices, the use of a fixed 3.5% would make the net benefits for a worker 
more sensitive to variations in the actual return on the Treasury bonds, because when 
bonds do poorly, the benefit offset would not change while the return to the investment 
portfolio will probably be smaller.   
At the normal age of retirement, the hypothetical sum for the PRA and the actual 
value of the PRA will be entered into an annuitization calculation.  Goss and Wade 
(2002) argue that the most likely case would be to use a fixed real annuity based on 
unisex mortality tables, and that married couples would have the annuity calculated as a 
joint and 2/3 survivor life annuity.  Retirees receive the annuity associated with their own 
PRA while the portion of their benefit from traditional Social Security would be offset by 
the hypothetical annuity amount.  In other words, workers can expect to receive a higher 
total Social Security benefit if their PRA portfolio grows at a real rate that is higher than 
3.5%.  Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) argue that workers will participate if they are 10 
sufficiently confident that they can develop an investment strategy which will garner a 
higher real rate of return than the benefit offset rate. 
This Plan 1 proposal is expected to push the Trust Fund further out of actuarial 
balance, though the details of this contention are understandably a bit controversial.  
According to Goss and Wade (2002), under this plan the 75 year actuarial balance will be 
pushed from -1.86 to -2.34, meaning that an increase in the payroll tax of 2.34 percentage 
points, instead of the 1.86 percentage points thought at the time, would be needed to keep 
the Trust Fund in balance.  However, advocates of the plan rightly point out that in some 
sense this is arbitrary, because the plan works by having the traditional Social Security 
Trust Fund receive less taxes in the short-term, whereas the associated decreases in 
benefits arise more in the long-term after the people with personal retirement accounts 
retire.  As such, some advocates of the plan argue that it should be considered as having 
no net effect on the actuarial balance.  Actually, the reverse subsidy of the offset rate 
should slightly help the fund as Social Security will be able to discount benefits at the 
offset rate of 3.5% while having been expected to earn only 3% in real terms had it held 
these assets itself.  This point is made by Diamond and Orszag (2002).  However, this is 
where the issue of transition costs arise, and questions remain about how financial 
markets would view increased government borrowing in the short-run, even if one was 
sure that the borrowing could be easily paid back in the long run.   
The second reform (Plan 2) offered by the President’s Commission includes a 
number of attributes in addition to the PRAs, and it is expected to lead to actuarial 
balance.  First, the PRA allows up to 4% of a worker’s taxable payroll, or up to $1,000 
indexed for wage growth, whichever is lower.  In present dollars, this means that workers 11 
earning more than $50,000 per year will be limited to contributing less than 2% of their 
taxable income to the PRA.  The other portion of the traditional payroll tax (at least 
8.4%) would go to the traditional Social Security Trust Fund.  This proposal also includes 
the benefit offsets using the hypothetical annuity method described before, though now 
the benefit offset rate is 2% plus inflation.  This lower offset rate means that Social 
Security will be subsidizing the owners of PRAs, as the assets would have earned a 3% 
return in the Trust Fund.  The payroll tax would also need to be increased by about 0.63 
percentage points to maintain actuarial balance, though the Commission supports 
transferring revenues from the government’s general budget instead of implementing a 
payroll tax increase.   
The method employed in Plan 2 to obtain Trust Fund balance is to have traditional 
benefits be price indexed rather than wage indexed.  This is the “price indexing” proposal, 
which is distinct from the current system of wage indexing.  It will lead to large 
reductions in the growth of benefits separate from the benefit offsets.  For young workers, 
payroll taxes would continue growing in real terms while benefits stay at the same real 
level.  The impact of this reform grows over time, and Pfau (2006) shows that after 60 
years, price indexing will reduce the total incomes of the poorest elderly by up to 50 
percent.  Plan 2 would create sustainability for the Social Security Trust Fund by 
substantially reducing the growth rate of future benefits from traditional Social Security 
under the assumption that workers would make up the difference with their personal 
accounts.  This would be implemented starting in 2009 by multiplying the bendpoint 
factor ratios of the Primary Insurance Amount formula by the ratio of the price index to 
the wage index (approximately 0.99 on average) from two years prior.  Other features of 12 
the proposal include for the minimum benefit level of a 30 year worker to be at least 
120% of the poverty level, and for widows to receive 75% of the total couples’ benefit 
instead of the present two-thirds. 
The third reform (Plan 3) adds additional complications.  The personal retirement 
account would consist of 2.5% of the taxable payroll up to the wage indexed $1,000 
level, with the requirement that the worker contributes an additional 1% of their income 
to the PRA.  Traditional benefits would be offset using the same hypothetical calculation 
with an offset rate of 2.5% plus inflation.  The 1% additional income would be partially 
subsidized in a progressive manner by a refundable tax credit.  The minimum benefit for 
30 years of work would be 100% of the poverty level, and 111% would be offered for 40 
years of work.  Initial benefit growth rates would be adjusted for future changes in life 
expectancy, which would translate into average benefit indexing rates of 0.5% above 
inflation.  Widows would also receive 75% of the total couple’s benefit.  Finally, the final 
bend factor of the PIA formula would be flattened from 15% to 10%, which would 
reduce benefits for wealthier workers.  
3   Personal Retirement Accounts and the Ownership of Benefits 
  If the goal is to make meaningful comparisons between PRAs and the current 
Social Security system, then it is vital that the proposals be put on an equal footing.  This 
means that the unfunded liabilities of the present system must be considered for a 
proposal that transitions to PRAs.  It also means that we must consider the nature of 
ownership as it applies to PRAs.  How free will people be to make decisions about their 
accounts?  It also means that we need to consider how PRAs would function if the owner 
becomes disabled or dies.  This is related to the need for evaluating the full value of 13 
existing Social Security benefits.  Finally, it is important to consider the potential returns 
to PRAs, and to think about what would be done if PRAs fail to meet their expected 
returns on a large-scale basis.   
3.1 Social Security’s Unfunded Liability 
Because Social Security began as a pay-as-you-go system whose earliest 
beneficiaries received generous retirement benefits after contributing very little to the 
program, part of Social Security taxes must be viewed as necessary payments on past 
debt for early retiree payments, and not as personal investments.  In fact, the 2005 
Trustee’s Report indicates that the present value of future costs less future taxes for past 
and current participants over the infinite horizon in $13.7 trillion.  Meanwhile, the Trust 
Fund only holds $1.7 trillion.  After accounting for the fact that future generations are 
already expected to pay more into the system than they will receive, this leaves a current 
unfunded liability of $11.1 trillion.   
If these debts are ignored, then the current retirees and people about to retire will 
be the ones to lose out on their promised benefits, having already paid for earlier 
beneficiaries without having anyone left to pay for their own benefits.  Any fair 
comparison of reforms will need to account for this.  This precludes a complete switch to 
PRAs, because the Trust Fund would quickly empty out.  Any PRA plan will put 
additional pressures on traditional Social Security by diverting some of its revenues, and 
this needs to be accounted for when discussing reform.   
3.2 Personal Retirement Accounts and the Freedom to Make Decisions 
  Will participation in PRAs be voluntary or mandatory?  Will participants be 
required to buy an annuity, or can they take lump-sum payments from their PRA savings 14 
or leave their PRA savings as a bequest?  How much freedom will a person have to 
choose their investment portfolio?  These three issues need to be resolved on account of 
the tradeoff between allowing greater freedom, and thus a greater degree of ownership, 
and having a more efficient pension system. 
On the first point, the President’s Commission insists that participation will be 
voluntary.  However, this is problematic, because without 100% participation the 
problems of adverse selection would almost certainly make the assumption of actuarially 
fair annuities based on the United States population impossible to maintain.  Second, the 
President’s Commission also suggests that there will be flexibility in the decision of 
whether or not one annuitizes their PRA holdings upon retirement, as long as the 
resulting benefits would place them above the poverty level.  The President’s 
Commission also suggests that those facing low survival probabilities at retirement (such 
as the terminally ill) may be allowed to opt out of annuitizing their assets.  But this would 
create further adverse selection problems that could undermine the value of annuities paid 
to those who actually decide to participate. 
It is worth considering some of the equity implications for whether the PRAs are 
mandatory or voluntary.  First, if they are voluntary, then since higher income individuals 
earn lower rates of return under the present system, they could be expected to have higher 
participation rates.  Removing these workers from traditional Social Security would 
weaken the ability of Social Security to redistribute wealth to lower-income workers, and 
would also leave lower-income workers with more of the responsibility for funding the 
liabilities of Social Security.  Also, because higher-income workers generally experience 
longer life spans, those lower-income individuals who participate could see their annuity 15 
levels drop if the annuity providers consider life tables for the actual PRA participants 
instead of the population at-large.  At the same time, since lower income individuals 
generally have higher mortality rates anyway, they may be less interested in the annuities 
provided by the PRAs, even if such annuities are calculated using life tables for the 
aggregate population.  This is because unlike with the annuity provided by Social 
Security, PRA owners may desire to leave the PRA assets to their descendents.  
Differential participation could also develop along gender lines, as men could be less apt 
to annuitize given that the value of their annuities will be pulled downward by the longer 
life spans of women.  There would also be a problem with forcing people to annuitize 
during a bearish stock market.  It may be the case that people delay their retirements 
beyond a comfortable age in order to wait for the stock market to return to more 
acceptable levels.   
The third important issue regards the amount of flexibility that will be provided to 
participants in choosing the contents of their investment portfolios.  The President’s 
Commission (2001) and Goss and Wade (2002) both assume a personal account portfolio 
vested 50% in equities, 30% in corporate bonds, and 20% in US Treasury long-term 
bonds.  This is a way to gain broad diversification, and it is necessary to improve the 
probabilities of achieving the account returns expected for PRA owners.  Equities are 
assumed to have a long-term average real yield of 6.5%, while corporate bonds and 
Treasury bonds have expected real returns of 3.5% and 3.0%, respectively.  
Administrative costs are assumed to be 0.3% of the annual balance.  The average real 
yield for such a portfolio is 4.6%.  Goss and Wade (2002) follow the methodology of the 
Trustee’s Report by creating three alternative assumptions for this portfolio.  In the 16 
pessimistic case, the combined return of this portfolio less administrative expenses drops 
to 2.7%, and in the optimistic case the returns less expenses are 6.8%.  
There are important implications regarding the provision of freedom in making 
account allocation decisions.  A gambler or risk-seeker could easily lose their entire 
account with a few unfortunate equity investments.  Meanwhile, those who wish to play it 
safe could choose a portfolio of bonds whose returns fail to beat the benefit offset rate, 
which is important if accounts are to provide larger returns than the traditional Social 
Security system.  For these reasons, it is expected that PRA holders will face a limited 
selection of investment options that include broad index funds of various kinds. 
3.3 Personal Retirement Accounts After Disability or Death 
An important issue which is often overlooked in the debate about PRAs regards 
what will happen to the PRA when a worker becomes disabled or dies.  This issue 
plagues a number of studies that have provided support for PRAs.  For instance, Feldstein 
and Ranguelova (2001) create a stochastic analysis for the equity returns of private 
accounts invested into stocks and bonds.  They conclude that a PRA with only 6% of 
payroll invested 60% in equities and 40% in bonds has only a 17% probability of 
returning annuities smaller than the presently legislated benefits available from a 12.4% 
payroll tax.  However, by only considering the retirement aspect of Social Security, the 
paper does an inadequate job of accounting for disability and survival benefits.  Risks of 
pre-retirement death and disability mean that the Feldstein and Ranguelova analysis 
undervalues existing Social Security benefits.   
  Feldstein and Liebman (2000), on the other hand, provide a more thorough 
analysis of private accounts and find that virtually all demographic groups they examine 17 
achieve higher average benefits with a partial private account than they would receive 
under existing Social Security rules.  However, this study has ex ante stacked the cards 
too much in favor of personal accounts.  Feldstein and Liebman’s results are a foregone 
conclusion because the entire contents of a worker’s private account are added to the 
worker’s benefit level, even in cases where the worker does not have any family 
members to bequeath the account to after an untimely pre-retirement death.  The study 
also ignores the current system’s disability benefits and benefits to children, which 
effectively denies the ability of the present system to “compete” with private accounts in 
providing wealth to loved ones.   
These problems also plague the analysis of policymakers.  How PRAs would be 
distributed in the event of disability or survivorship is uncertain, as is clear in reading the 
President’s Commission report.  Commission members Cogan and Mitchell (2002) 
argued in a separate paper that with regard to disability and survivor benefits, the 
contents of the personal retirement account are not accessible until the worker or 
surviving spouse reaches their retirement age.  The alternative would be to allow PRAs to 
be accessed at younger ages with an offset for traditional benefits, but these resulting 
annuities could be quite small.  This means that with Plan 1, any benefits distributed 
before the normal retirement age for survivorship (or disability) will be calculated the 
same way as in present law, and at the time of the normal retirement age there is an 
adjustment in benefits made for the PRA annuity and offset.  However, for Plan 2 this 
means that pre-retirement benefits may be much lower than presently legislated on 
account of the price indexing aspect of the reform proposals.  At the age of retirement, 18 
both plans are likely to provide smaller annuities as a result of the deceased or disabled 
worker having experienced a shorter working career.  
  Advocates of PRAs argue that they provide their users with a method for passing 
wealth to relatives.  But these advocates ignore the role of disability and survivor benefits 
in passing wealth on to relatives.  Thus, they overlook a key part of the existing system.  
The primary function of the PRAs is not to create an inheritance, but rather to allow 
investment in equities and bonds that could potentially increase the rates of return from 
Social Security.  Thus, when analyzing PRAs, it is more reasonable to assume that single 
males and single females do not have anyone to pass their PRA on to in the event of an 
untimely death.  This assumption runs counter to the Feldstein and Liebman (2000) 
assumption that the PRA would be bequeathed to “someone else.”  Of course, if the PRA 
assets of a young deceased single worker are counted as part of his/her lifetime benefits, 
this will drastically increase their rate of return and lifetime transfers of PRAs, even 
though the recipient of such a bequest would be so far removed from the worker.   
3.4 The Return to Personal Retirement Accounts  
  The debate whether the United States should adopt personal retirement accounts 
as a part of Social Security reform has, in many ways, taken place assuming a best case 
scenario for the accounts.  There are many uncertainties regarding the benefit a worker 
may eventually receive from their personal account.  The returns to be obtained from 
personal retirement accounts are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about 
investment portfolio composition, the performance of financial markets, the size of 
administrative costs, the nature of the annuitization process, and the treatment of account 
bequests upon death.  The price of annuities depends on the expected remaining lifespan 19 
of the annuitant and whether the life tables used are for the population at-large or are 
more individual specific, the possibility of adverse selection in the annuity purchasing 
population, the profit requirements of the annuity providers, and the interest rate that the 
annuitant expects to be able to earn on the reserves of the annuitized PRA.  Many 
scenarios could unfold to create situations with low PRA benefit levels for some retirees. 
   A few studies exist which simulate personal accounts using past data.  For 
example, Burtless (2000) examines the historical record by allowing the proposed system 
of personal retirement accounts to have applied to each cohort retiring from 1911 to 
1999, in order to examine the extent of financial risk imposed by a shift to personal 
accounts.  Burtless ultimately opposes personal retirement account proposals because of 
their allocation of risk exclusively to individual workers rather than sharing risk over 
time and across the population.  The paper finds that a 40 year working career does not 
provide confidence that the return from a private account can match the historical average 
return.  Workers retiring several years apart could generate quite divergent annuity 
amounts, and the higher the portion of the personal account dedicated to equities, the 
greater the variability in outcomes.  For instance, a worker depositing six percent of 
income into a personal account invested in equities created pensions through the 
historical period ranging from less than 20% of peak career earnings to more than 100% 
of peak earnings.  More conservative investment portfolios occasionally lead to even 
smaller returns at the lower end, and the ultimate conclusion of the paper is that personal 
retirement accounts would create too much risk that pensions would not be adequate to 
finance a comfortable retirement.   20 
  More recently, Shiller (2005) studies this issue using a wider variety of possible 
investment patterns, including life-cycle investing.  He finds that with a life-cycle 
investment portfolio, accounts would only beat a 3% real offset in 68% of the historical 
cases, and the median real rate of return from the PRA is 3.4%.  But if one accounts for 
the lower worldwide return on equities, then the personal account would only beat the 3% 
offset in 29% of cases.   
  These studies do not completely account for the risk of the stock market, since 
they only use historical data.  But whereas they at least make an effort to account for the 
effects of fluctuating returns, the President’s Commission ignores the risk of investing in 
the stock market by assuming that the stock market will produce a constant real (after 
inflation) return of 6.5 percent each year into the future.  Meanwhile, as indicated, they 
assume corporate bonds will provide exact real returns of 3.5 percent, and Treasury 
bonds will offer a 3 percent real return.  They also assume that the administrative costs 
for maintaining these accounts will be 0.3 percent each year.  Then, in their baseline case 
for personal accounts, they assume workers will hold an investment portfolio consisting 
of 50% stocks, 30% corporate bonds, and 20% long-term Treasury bonds.  After 
deducting administrative costs, they assume this portfolio will provide a constant annual 
real return of 4.6 percent for each year in the future. 
This is problematic because financial markets do not provide such a constant 
return each year.  While the stock market may yield higher returns on average, it does this 
by forcing investors to accept greater risks of large year-to-year fluctuations.  Thus, there 
is no guarantee of higher benefits for any particular individual.  The President’s 21 
Commission always shows workers getting higher returns with personal retirement 
accounts because a 4.6 real return always beats the benefit offset rate.   
In an attempt to better account for this risk, we generate 10,000 computer 
simulations of portfolio returns which maintain the same long-run assumptions as the 
President’s Commission, but incorporate fluctuations over time that are driven by the  
Table 1: Stochastic Returns from Personal Retirement Accounts with Different Assumptions: 










Portfolio: 50% stocks, 50% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 6.5% 
Administrative Costs: 0.3% 
Overhead Costs: 0% 
0.8%  91.0%  68.0%  33.0% 
Portfolio: 50% stocks, 50% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 5% 
Administrative Costs: 0.3% 
Overhead Costs: 0% 
2.3%  81.0%  50.2%  19.0% 
Portfolio: 20% stocks, 80% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 6.5% 
Administrative Costs: 0.3% 
Overhead Costs: 0% 
0.0%  94.0%  53.0%  8.0% 
Portfolio: 0% stocks, 100% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 6.5% 
Administrative Costs: 0.3% 
Overhead Costs: 0% 
0.0%  80.0%  32.0%  4.0% 
Portfolio: 50% stocks, 50% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 6.5% 
Administrative Costs: 1% 
Overhead Costs: 0% 
2.3%  82.2%  51.3%  19.9% 
Portfolio: 50% stocks, 50% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 6.5% 
Administrative Costs: 0.3% 
Overhead Costs: 15% 
2.6%  81.2%  52.0%  20.7% 
Portfolio: 50% stocks, 50% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 6.5% 
Administrative Costs: 1% 
Overhead Costs: 15% 
5.5%  68.2%  34.3%  10.1% 
Portfolio: 50% stocks, 50% bonds 
Real long-run average return on stocks: 5% 
Administrative Costs: 1% 
Overhead Costs: 15% 
12.7%  52.5%  22.2%  4.8% 
Source: author’s calculations 22 
variation in stock and bond market returns that we have observed since 1950.  This way, 
workers will occasionally enjoy extraordinarily high returns for their accounts, but also 
risk ending up with negative returns.  The results are displayed in Table 1. 
In many ways, we still have the best case scenario for personal accounts, but we 
can begin to see how personal accounts are not infallible.  The probability of earning a 
higher rate of return than the benefit offset rate for Plan 2 (2%) is about 91 percent.  Thus, 
in 9 percent of these simulations, workers end up with lower benefits by adopting an 
account even before considering the additional cuts from the price indexing of traditional 
benefits.  The corresponding number for Plan 1 (3.5%) is 68 percent.  Thus, in 32 percent 
of cases, under the best scenario example, workers should not expect to beat the benefit 
offset rate. 
Now consider what may happen if the future is not as rosy as the President’s 
Commission expects.  First, can the stock market really even provide an average real 
return of 6.5 percent?  There are several reasons to question whether individuals could 
expect to earn the historical averages for stocks and bonds.  Even if the market produces 
these returns, there is a question whether individuals would be able to take advantage of 
it.  To do so, they must follow the advice of buying a diverse portfolio that tracks major 
stock and bond indices and keeps low administrative costs.  Second, there is doubt 
whether the stock market will be able to continue producing such high returns in the 
future.  The Social Security Administration assumes a future GDP growth rate of 1.8 
percent, which is not compatible with such high stock returns.  And, if the economy 
grows fast enough to produce these stock returns, then much of Social Security’s funding 
problems will be solved by economic growth.  If we adjust the average future real return 23 
to the stock market from 6.5 percent to 5 percent, then there is an 81 percent chance for 
private accounts to produce a larger return than the benefit offset rate in Plan 2.  
  In addition, while the baseline case assumes that the investment portfolio is held 
half in stocks and half in bonds, the Commission also suggests that those who are afraid 
of risk can choose to hold more bonds in their personal accounts.  Unfortunately, holding 
more bonds makes it more difficult to beat the benefit offset rate.  Just like stocks, bonds 
do not produce a constant return each year.  Even though bonds pay a fixed rate each 
period, their real returns fluctuate with changing inflation and market interest rates, just 
not to the same extent as stocks.  If someone decides to hold only corporate and 
government bonds in their portfolio, the chance of beating the 2 percent benefit offset 
rate falls to about 80 percent.   
  The President’s Commission’s assumption of 0.3% administrative costs is also on 
the optimistic side.  The assumption might be reasonable, but only if workers are required 
to choose from a small number of passively managed index funds.  Reasons to expect 
higher costs include that many personal retirement accounts will be quite small and thus 
harder for financial institutions to manage at such a low percentage.  Also, if workers 
wish to choose actively managed funds, then the costs will be higher.  Costs would be 
higher because the government would take responsibility to educate the public about 
investment strategies such as diversification, risk, and optimal portfolio allocation.  Baker 
(1998) believes that administrative costs could be as high as 1 to 2 percent annually.   
Returning to the baseline portfolio, if administrative costs were raised to one percent each 
year, then the probability of developing a portfolio that beats the 2 percent benefit offset 
rate falls to 82 percent. 24 
  Buying annuities is also not the free lunch that the Commission suggests.  The 
President’s Commission assumes that retirees will be able to purchase an actuarially fair 
annuity at the time of retirement and not have to pay any overhead or administrative 
costs.  But according to the way that annuity markets currently operate, it would be 
seemingly impossible.  Annuity providers are constrained because they need to cover 
their costs of business.  Also, if personal accounts are voluntary, there will be adverse 
selection.  People who expect to live shorter lives will decide not to buy an annuity.  This 
leaves a remaining population of annuitants who will live longer, on average, than the 
United States population considered as a whole.  Companies that sell annuities will have 
to account for the longer lives of these people and therefore offer them a smaller annuity 
payment each year.     
  In total, researchers such as Walliser (1998) have pointed out that these costs add 
up to somewhere around 15 – 25 percent of the amount of money one has accumulated at 
the time of purchasing an annuity.  If overhead costs were 15 percent, then the probability 
of having a higher real return than 2 percent falls to 81 percent.  Meanwhile, if we 
combine administrative costs of 1 percent a year along with an overhead cost of 15 
percent, then the probability of developing a portfolio that beats the 2 percent benefit 
offset rate falls to 68 percent.  If we further add in the assumption that stocks will have a 
5 percent real return on average, then the probability of beating the benefit offset rate in 
Plan 2 is only 52.5%.  Those are not necessarily bets that people would be willing to take 
with their retirement incomes, especially as price indexing is also decreasing the value of 
the traditional portion of the benefit. 25 
  Personal accounts are, without a doubt, supposed to provide workers with much 
higher benefits, so that they can still earn more for retirement despite the huge reductions 
created by price indexing.  But the chances of personal accounts producing as high of 
returns as the President’s Commission assumes are very suspect.  The “ownership” of 
Social Security in this case transfers the ownership of many risks from the government to 
workers, and how society will respond to keep the elderly out of poverty must be 
considered.   
4   Conclusion 
Aging populations are affecting many countries.  In some countries, such as Japan, 
Italy, or Germany, the situation is already much worse than that in the United States.  On 
the other hand, many transitioning economies have young populations and are still in the 
process of determining the nature of their pension systems.  The lessoned to be learned is 
that pay-as-you-go pension systems are not necessarily ideal in countries with aging 
populations, especially if they are overly generous to their early recipients.  Some may 
view a switch to PRAs as a solution for the aging world, but such analysis is 
oversimplified if it does not account for the unfunded liabilities of the existing pension 
system, or if it does not properly value the benefits (including survivor and disability 
benefits) of the existing system, or if it does not take care in incorporating the increased 
risks created by equity investments.  A selling point of PRAs in the United States is that 
they will create an ownership stake that puts people in control of their economic destiny.  
Upon closer inspection, it is not clear how meaningful such promises of an ownership 
stake will be.   
 26 
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